44567 | 30 Dec. 2025 | 08:50
ISA: Questions for 2026: Will there be a government? Will there be a party of Radev? Will there be a reformatting of the party system?
2025 did not resolve the political crisis in Bulgaria. We enter 2026 with a government in resignation, a change in the monetary system, and again early elections - most likely at the end of March.
These are the conclusions of the Institute for Strategies and Analyses, published in their monthly analysis for the last month of 2025.
The political year of 2025 was turbulent - it began with the formation of a regular government with a declared anti-crisis profile and ended with its resignation after massive protests. The lack of trust in the political elite remains the number one risk for the country. Politics is replaced by scandals and daily intrigues, manipulations, accusations, remarks, performances. The information environment is changing. Mainstream is losing ground as a main source of information that shapes public opinion. The uncertainty in a rapidly changing world is combined with a massive change in our country - the national currency. This has caused additional worry and stress among Bulgarian citizens, which reflects on their expectations for politics.
AUTUMN OF DISCONTENT
After the final decision to join the Eurozone, tension in the country started to rise. Autumn began with a vote of no confidence, passed through the elections in Pazardzhik, and entered the last month of 2025 with the eruption of the most powerful protests since 1990, triggered by the budget. The earthquake was mainly provoked by two things: fears of the debt spiral and arrogance of the ruling parties. A strong irritant is the widening gap between social groups. Bulgaria is now being governed by an elite with solid financial and material resources. Citizen demands for our political elite are reasonably increasing. The protests covered a wide range of topics - from higher wages to the supremacy of law and the protection of democracy. This is an indicator that society is rumbling, dissatisfied, looking for relief, and may once again recognize someone as a Savior. Against the backdrop of the escalation in which the protest was caught up, the resignation was inevitable, and the decision of the leader of GERB Boyko Borisov was correct. Refusal or delay of the resignation would have ignited a kind of revolt and compromised the coalition parties. Bulgaria is considered a European country where such large-scale protests lead to a reset of trust.
THE SOLUTION WILL BE IN 2026 - WILL THERE BE "TWO-IN-ONE" ELECTIONS?
The outcome in 2026 will depend primarily on two factors - the democratic reflexes of Bulgarian society and geopolitical developments. If the scale and nature of the protests serve as a starting point, the option for high voter turnout and a representation different from the current one is very likely. The campaign for participation in the protests is already turning into a campaign for participation in the elections. For young people, this is shaping up to be the new trend.
With high tension and deepening political crisis, it is possible that there will be "two-in-one" elections at the end of the year - presidential and repeat early parliamentary, as was the case in November 2021, when Radev won his second presidential term with the support of the CC-DB. As the ambition of the CC-DB to win a majority appears difficult to achieve, if not impossible, the formation of a government will once again be a difficult task.
The protests in December 2025 echoed the beginning of democratic changes, with the main reason being the scale of dissatisfaction with the existing governance model.
There is a sense that an era is coming to an end, just like what happened 36 years ago.
In 2026, there will be many similarities to 1990, when political life in Bulgaria was marked by confrontation and protests, only to find its resolution through compromise and coalition at the end of 1990. The change is very noticeable geopolitically, and the parallel is inevitable. The transformation of Europe is looming, as the first division will be both within societies and between European states along the line of war and peace.
FLAWS OF THE "ZHELYAZKOV" CABINET
The main goal of the "Zhelyazkov" cabinet and the majority that supported it in parliament was strategic and of great importance - Bulgaria's entry into the Eurozone. This provided the government with relative calm in the first six months, when even the opposition party CC-DB refrained from sharp movements. After the replacement of the lev with the euro became an irreversible process, two things happened:
- the government felt stable, became proud and made mistakes in communicating with society, relying on a forceful approach rather than dialogue;
- the opposition immediately took advantage of the situation and the political crisis returned in full force, with protests gaining serious grounds to unfold. The mass expectations were for the cabinet to govern at least until the presidential elections next year, but that did not happen.
July was the turning point - the decision to join the eurozone thawed all internal political conflicts. The arrest of the mayor of Varna, Blagomir Kotsev, was also carried out, and the subsequent fourth no-confidence vote against "Zhelyazkov" showed that the anti-government front was growing.
The solid majority in parliament created the illusory mindset that fundamental principles such as broad discussion of the budget, respecting social interests, and adequate communication between government and society could be ignored.
The protests in December were a direct continuation of those in 2020. Both then and now, the trigger was the use of force in politics. Both then and now, those in power accepted what they desired to be true, and that was a grave mistake. The excessive self-assurance of the majority, that the lack of alternatives would quiet dissent, provoked the protests that brought down the cabinet.
THIS TIME Radev DID NOT RAISE THE PROTESTS
The protests and the resignation of the government put President Radev in front of the difficult decision whether to continue his political career as a party leader now or to finish his mandate and wait for a new chance. Where do the hesitations come from? First, the factor "time" plays an important role. The protests developed at the speed of a "blitzkrieg" and Radev seems to be not ready structurally, psychologically, organizationally. Secondly, it was not Radev who raised the squares this time. Is the President sure that his party will be the alternative with a capital A? Radev's project has been recognized as a political opponent even before it appeared. On the other hand, the emergence of the presidential party is starting to lose weight, as time is a factor that works against such a project. Rumen Radev held consultations with political parties in December, and in January he will start the constitutional process for the mandate distribution. If he decides to participate in the elections with his party, he would have to resign before the appointment of a caretaker prime minister. Otherwise, there is a conflict of interest - for the president to appoint a prime minister who will organize the elections in which he will participate as a party leader. On the other hand, if Radev remains at the top of the state and creates a party after the end of his mandate, it could be interpreted as a decision of an already unemployed politician. The main conclusion for Radev is that so far he has allowed projects that quickly eroded. The party system has fragmented and reduced to political forces for which one million votes in elections are unattainable.
The year 2026 will provide an answer to the question whether Radev was trying to position himself as the next political savior? And whether he will be recognized as such.
THE DEGRADATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS BECOME SOCIALLY INTOLERABLE
The degradation of the National Assembly has become socially intolerable. The critically low trust in the National Assembly is not only due to physical clashes and uncontrollable aggression. The denial is also generated through the selection of party personnel and candidates for members of parliament, continues with the lack of trust in the electoral process, and becomes sustained through the parliament’s results and the behavior of our elected officials. The degrading attitude of the deputies towards each other, the insults they regularly hurl at each other, the informal behavior often observed in the plenary hall, and the escalation to physical fights, erases any authority of the legislative body. The battle for fair elections obviously cannot be fought solely by the parties that have failed to restore trust in the electoral process over the last three decades. We do not exclude a serious confrontation between civil society and party representatives in the upcoming elections. There is another way to combat the dependent vote - high voter turnout. Participation in elections is seen as a natural continuation of civil protests and this could engage the young and active generation. If this happens, we expect a change in the electoral landscape, regardless of whether there will be new political players.
WITH THE RESIGNATION OF THE BORISOV'S CABINET, GERB IS PRESERVED
With the resignation of the government, GERB leader Boyko Borisov maintains the party's chances of remaining a factor in Bulgarian politics. If they had continued to develop, the '#2025Protests could have jeopardized two key things: GERB's leading role and Borisov's ability to accurately assess the political situation. Borisov is a situational player, adaptive, with an instinct to survive. The last proof is the requested resignation. It was a mistake that the decision to withdraw the budget 2026 was not protected until the end, which fueled the protest, demanding the withdrawal of the government itself. With the resignation of the "Zhelyazkov" cabinet, formed during GERB's mandate, a one-year political process has come to an end. The leading aspect of this process was the fact that this was the first government formed by the party in which Boyko Borisov was not the Prime Minister. According to ISA, this led to several peculiarities in the development of the process, which also had an impact on the party. With the formation of the "Zhelyazkov" cabinet, GERB emerged from isolation. The key moment: GERB proved that it has regained its ability to attract coalition partners. The appearance of only Denitsa Zheleva at the president's consultations was an important sign that the relationship between GERB and Borisov and President Radev is tense and will continue to develop in a confrontational manner. The question that will seek an answer after the 2026 elections is whether GERB has maintained its centrist potential.
CC-DB CHANGED THEIR STYLE AND BEGAN TO TURN THE POLITICAL GAME AROUND
The parties from CC-DB have become more active, changed their style and started to turn the political game around. They went from defense to attack, using various weapons/tools – verbal challenges, actual provocations, protests, focused social media campaigns. PP-DB have two main opponents along the two dividing lines. On the Euro-Atlantic line – Radev, on the anti-corruption line – Peevski, but they have both interacted in the past – they supported Radev for a second term, worked with Peevski within the "coalition". This makes representatives of the coalition unconvincing.
For the reversed trend, which was pointing downwards, they needed political actions and successes. They came in the last months of the year. The activation of CC-DB began after Bulgaria met the criteria for the Eurozone and after the arrest of Blagomir Kotshev. As of today, we can conclude that the strength of CC-DB came from Borisov's hesitations. Furthermore, coalition representatives used his emotional attitudes to drive a wedge between him and Peevski. CC-DB moved towards hybrid resistance, which influences the government both through parliamentary and non-parliamentary means. The leader of CC, Asen Vasilev, stated the overly ambitious goal for CC-DB to win at least 121 deputies, which would secure them a majority for independent governance.
At this stage, this seems impossible. "Revival" Affirms its Profile as a Populist, Eurosceptic, and Pro-Russian Formation
"Revival" maintains a strong political pace throughout 2025 with peaks of radicalization. Such were the protests against the euro in front of the House of Europe, when effigies of European politicians were burned, or the statements of its leader Kostadin Kostadinov, that Bulgaria needs not confidence votes, but a revolution. Kostadinov developed a sharp opposition rhetoric, directed at Peevski and Borisov, maintaining consistency in the demand for new parliamentary elections and actively supported the protests.
The conclusion of ISA is that "Revival" is emerging as the most successful nationalist project in Bulgaria in recent years, taking advantage of the mistakes of the neoliberal status quo at a crucial moment in history.
"Rise for "Revival" can be expected if the effects of entering the eurozone are negative. A higher voter turnout, if achieved, may prevent its smaller competitors from surpassing the 4% barrier.
MRF- POLITICAL PROCESSES THROUGHOUT 2025 WERE DRIVEN BY PEEVSKI
For MRF, the year 2025 was extremely dynamic, and this dynamic will continue in 2026 as well. The reasons are both the elections - parliamentary and presidential, and the focus on party leader Delyan Peevski. Developments in October 2025 - the victory in the elections in Pazardzhik and talks about the potential reshuffling of the government, placed the party in the center of public attention. The end result was an increase in the perception of Delyan Peevski's key role in Bulgarian politics." We confirm the fact that the main driving force behind the dynamics surrounding the MRF was the hyperactivity of Delian Peevski. The process went through several phases that positioned the MRF as an influential centrist formation, rather than a balancer. During the time of Dogan, the focus was on the "Bulgarian ethnic model", now it is on working for the people. After Peevski took over the leadership of the MRF, the clear difference is between conservatism-globalism, with MRF being closer to the policies of the current administration in the White House, while CC-DB is closer to the ideological views of the Democrats. Peevski is a strong enemy who has been underestimated by the liberal community. CC-DB was forced to revive street forms of pressure against the opponent/enemy, who is one of the most powerful political factors in the country. The strengthening of the state's role in governance and regulation processes is a political goal that Peevski has repeatedly announced: "the most important thing is to maintain the stability of the state." The influence of MRF is growing in some places and this is the basis from which its national influence could "bounce" off. The enigmatic cabinet 222A has been turned into a museum of "the assembly". The exhibition includes photos of Peevski with leaders of CC-DB from the time of their joint work in the government with Prime Minister Nikolay Denkov. With this move, MRF enters the election period, and we expect the main focus of their campaign to be the revelations about the double standards in the behavior of their main opponent - CC-DB. We predict that the focus of a positive campaign by the MRF will be on work in favor of the citizens, and first and foremost – the social groups that are in greater need of the redistributive role of the state.
The BSP – THE LEFT'S NARRATIVE NEEDS NEW ACCENTS
An optimistic start, but a conflicting end in 2025 is recorded for the BSP. The party attempted a restart/refresh/stabilization after the "Ninova" era through participation in power. But the withdrawal of "Zhelaskyov" puts BSP to the test.
The party's involvement in a coalition with the right-wing GERB was met with confusion by its sympathizers, and the party's leadership did not have enough time to convincingly defend their decision. ISA'S FORECAST is that the BSP will seek a path and dialogue with the presidential party, if it becomes a fact. This is important, especially in light of the presidential elections - is it possible to have a joint candidacy, respectively a candidate supported by both BSP and Radev? The question is open. BSP's participation in power has dulled its political reflexes. The most experienced party, with the longest history, has lost its appetite for political battles, simply because it believes that the opposition is weak and divided. The left narrative needs new accents. BSP is facing the most serious challenge in its over a century old history.
IF "THERE IS SUCH A NATION" - WILL THERE BE SUCH A PARTY?
If "There is such a nation" is capable of change and surprises, they are only with a clearly negative sign. From a political project that had concentrated the expectations of a high share of society for a change in the model, it turned into a mainstay of the status quo and a consumer of power. The collapse of the party has already begun, structures and iconic figures (Andrey Chorbanov) are leaving.
SWORD FEEDS ON CRISIS AND RADICAL RHETORIC
As a situational and leadership party without a clear ideology, MUH feeds on crisis and struggles to make a public impression with loud phrases, final messages, and radical rhetoric. Its existence will depend on the (anti)fame of its leader Radostin Vassilev. By the end of the year, it becomes increasingly clear that Bulgaria's economic growth will be significantly higher than the EU average, unemployment is at its historic lowest levels, and inflation cannot catch up to incomes to consume them. December 2025 puts an end to the doubts and hopes of Eurosceptics that we will not enter the eurozone. They will have to continue searching for arguments for "We told you so", but the arguments will not be found because of the Euro, but because of the risks and systemic problems of the Bulgarian economy, which have still not been solved even by the year 2025.
"GREATENSS" IS INCAPABLE OF OFFERING LONG-TERM POLICIES
"GREATENSS" is a typical anti-system party of the new generation, born out of the situation, based on denial, and incapable of offering long-term policies. That is why sociologists already place it below the 4% threshold.
2025 WAS ECONOMICALLY GOOD, BUT WE FEEL IT AS VERY BAD
We are ending 2025 as a relatively good economic year, but we feel it as very bad. Bulgaria ranks among the top 5 countries with the highest turnovers throughout the year, along with Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg and Lithuania.
As a result of increasing deposits, the banking system is becoming over-liquid and has deposits of 154.09 billion leva. This is 70.2 percent of the projected GDP with a total annual growth rate of 13.6 percent. Whether these savings will remain in banks or return outside the banking system will become clear in the first weeks of the new year, when the need for cash payments, although reduced, will continue to guide money flows. In the month, the gold rush in Bulgaria set new records. The price of gold (14 carats) jumped from 94.15 leva per gram at the beginning of the year to 141.3 leva per gram at the end of the month. Nevertheless, gold sales have reached unprecedented levels. It is estimated that by the end of this year, they will exceed 1 billion leva.
Exports remain a major problem for the Bulgarian economy for the upcoming year. The perception of the economy has nothing to do with the real economy and the gap between reality and perceptions is widening, for which the euro is hardly to blame. We are definitely richer, more secure in our jobs in a very uncertain world that has prepared new surprises for us, and the next economic year will be worse than the current one - economic growth will be lower and external and internal shocks will not decrease.
Mobile verison
RSS
