22121 | 7 Oct. 2025 | 14:44

The idea for the creation of a Mediterranean NATO by Greece, Israel, Egypt and Cyprus is being launched. Is Cyprus the next Palestine?

Simeon Nikolov  

 Simeon Nikolov is a long-time diplomat, former Deputy Minister of Defense and chief expert at the President's Administration. He is a member of the Management Board of the Bulgarian Diplomatic Society. He is the founder and chief editor of the online publication "Expert-BDD" which provides analysis in the field of international politics, security and diplomacy. He is also the director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Security and International Relations. The text is published in the publication of BDD - expert-bdd.com.

 The security and stability of Europe, in addition to economic and military development, will largely be determined by that of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as by the trends and influence of neighboring countries and regions. After the war in Ukraine, the hostility between East and West will be preserved for many years, along with limited bilateral relations accompanied by occasional incidents and disputes.

 This means further militarization in the Black Sea, which directly affects Bulgaria. But it also increases the risks typical of a border zone between two warring alliances of states.  Therefore, we can expect not only the involvement of coastal countries in regional conflicts or accidental incidents, but also the allocation of significant budget resources for military needs and the deployment of larger allied contingents and new weapons systems, as well as instability in most of them.

 In the changed security environment, regardless of how the war in Ukraine ends, the position of countries like Turkey, for example, will be of particular importance to Europe as an ally, competitor, source of risks, but in any case a partner with whom we should strengthen cooperation in the field of defense and our policies in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea.

 Of interest is the launch in early 2025 of the  Discussions for the creation of a Mediterranean NATO by Greece, Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus, which were raised by scientific and political circles close to the intelligence services of Greece. These countries will evidently aim to strengthen economic and security ties between the Eastern Mediterranean, Indo-Mediterranean, and Free Seas regions, which encompass the Black Sea areas. The strong connections between these free and open spaces would "enhance the resilience of all three theaters, while limiting the maneuverability of the Turkey-Russia-Iran nexus in the shared space."

 Here lies the question of to what extent the European security architecture will change and the expectation that Turkey will continue to balance its relations even after the war. Her joining the "coalition of the willing", led by the United Kingdom and France, and her readiness to participate in the control of the Black Sea region is undoubtedly a signal of a certain change, but her behavior towards Greece, Cyprus, and the disputes in the Mediterranean leave doubts about her future policies.

 On the other hand, the significant increase in the importance of her military industry, technical achievements, expanding sales of military products and influence in the region and beyond should not be overlooked. The strengthening of her ties with EU member states in the defense sector should also not be underestimated. Spain and Italy have even surpassed Germany and the USA in their arms exports to Turkey.

 According to EU data, Turkey can contribute up to 35% of defense products together with other European countries under the new EU SAFE mechanism. However, the strategic and geopolitical importance of Turkey does not compensate for the continuing retreat in democratic norms in the country and the ongoing autocratization of its political system. Some Western European countries consider its role in securing the Eastern Mediterranean to be vital, while "the relatively limited involvement of Ankara in the Western Mediterranean, especially in relation to Morocco and Algeria", reduces the risk of bilateral tension. However, other countries such as France strongly support Greece in its criticism towards Turkish ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus.

 Therefore, there are now three groups of European countries according to their relationship with Turkey: Relatively friendly - Poland, Spain and Italy; Cautious and reserved - Sweden, Finland and Germany; Countries that are against any commitments with Turkey - France and Greece.

 Paris is concerned that Turkish ambitions in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean are contradicting French priorities. Greek concerns are specific and immediate: violations of airspace, naval surveillance, and threats of changes in the maritime status quo.

 At a recent European strategic forum, Turkish military officers and analysts, emphasizing the complexity of the strategic balance, presented concepts reflecting a gradual shift of Turkish naval power from deterrence to enforcement. The new doctrine prioritizes power projection, control over sea lines of communication (SLOC), developing capabilities for denying access/area denial (A2/AD), and autonomous presence in multiple operational theaters. According to Greek military experts, the Turkish naval thought is developing towards a doctrine of "hybrid maritime control", combining the concept of denial of control over the sea with missions for limited projection of power in critical points of interest. This model is adapted to geographically confined spaces such as the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara's ambition to act as an autonomous participant in the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, and Indo-Pacific region is reflected in its capabilities under the "Blue Homeland" program, including building frigates, drones, and front logistics basing (such as in Somalia and Libya).

 From a Turkish perspective, naval supremacy is seen as a necessary counterbalance to the diplomatic pressure from the EU, the military presence of countries like France and the UAE, and the geographic location of Greece.

 The Greek position is that the National Maritime Strategy should be in line with the modern framework of the Alliance, as defined in NATO's Maritime Strategy. The conclusion of the Greek military strategists is that the Strategic communication with Ankara should clearly distinguish between deterrence and threat, stability and dominance, and influence and coercion.

 Israel now believes that Northern Cyprus is not just a Greek-Cypriot problem - it is also an Israeli one. According to Israel, Northern Cyprus operates as an international no-man's-land, which allows for Turkey and terrorist groups such as Hamas and Iranian forces "Quds" unlimited operational freedom. The opposition in Cyprus recently warned that Israel is creating a "backyard" in the EU island state in response to increasing property acquisitions in the country by Israeli investors. "Israel sees Turkey as a serious threat to Greece, Cyprus, and of course, to Israel. There are also calls for Israel, in coordination with Greece and Cyprus, to prepare an operation to liberate the northern part of the island. Cyprus seems to have a problem." Can Cyprus be the next Palestine, Timoti Alexander Guzman asks in his own blog, Silent Crow News.

 The EU continues its security cooperation with Ankara, despite Turkey's occupation of EU territory - a contradiction that undermines trust in the EU and poses a risk to Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. The geopolitical interests of three countries - Egypt, Turkey, and Greece - intersect in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Libyan stage. Athens has growing security concerns about the rise of the "Muslim Brotherhood." Turkish support for the "Muslim Brotherhood" since 2011 has also made the group a focus of interest for Egypt and Greece. Athens considers the stability of Egypt as a key factor for its national security, given the country's geographical location, which makes it the "first gate" to Europe towards the southern Mediterranean.

 In terms of geopolitics, the relationship between Egypt and Turkey is closely intertwined with the relationship between Egypt and Greece, as the geopolitical interests of the three countries - Egypt, Turkey, and Greece - intersect in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Libyan stage. Ankara signed a memorandum of understanding to expand oil and gas exploration in Libyan waters, which sparked objections from Greece and the European Union, who consider these agreements invalid due to their violation of Greek maritime rights.

 After the maritime border demarcation agreement, signed between Libya and Turkey, remained unsettled for nearly six years, this issue was brought back in July 2025, against the backdrop of strong Greek objections and growing European efforts to limit any Libyan steps towards legalizing this agreement.

 Cairo and Athens are willing to undermine the Turkish-Libyan maritime agreements, given the threat they pose to their strategic interests in the Mediterranean Sea. Greece views the Turkish agreement for demarcation of the border with Tripoli as an encroachment on its exclusive economic zone. We can expect Cairo to continue trying to balance the developing relations with Turkey, despite the ongoing tension surrounding events in Libya, while maintaining stable relations with Greece and Cyprus. These relations are historically stable and based on trust and respect, unlike the unstable relationship between Egypt and Turkey.