On October 9, 1944, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill negotiated the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans. The conversation became known as the “percentages agreement” or the “napkin agreement,” but historian Prof. Iskra Baeva says that the fate of nations is not decided by such arrangements alone. Military actions and the actual balance of power are decisive.

Churchill proposed that the Soviet Union should hold 90% influence in Romania and 75% in Bulgaria. Britain would have 90% influence in Greece, while Yugoslavia and Hungary were assigned a 50–50 division.

Baeva describes the agreement as an indisputable historical fact. It is confirmed not only by Churchill’s memoirs but also by the recollections of Valentin Berezhkov, Stalin’s English translator. However, she does not regard the date as one that, by itself, changed the course of history. In her view, the arrangement mainly recorded a situation that had already emerged and did not create a new political reality. She also notes that the post-Second World War era has ended and has become part of history.

The famous scene took place during a dinner in Moscow. Churchill wrote the percentages on a napkin and handed it to Stalin, who marked them with his pencil. Formal negotiations began the following day between delegations led by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman did not take part but was aware of how the talks were proceeding. Thus, although the arrangement was made between two European powers, the third major power—the United States—was also present in the broader diplomatic setting.

The napkin initially assigned 75% Soviet influence in Bulgaria, but the figure rose to 80% in the subsequent negotiations. According to Baeva, the percentages were conditional and did not establish a specific division in military or economic matters. They indicated the balance of power.

This is especially clear in the cases of Yugoslavia and Hungary, where the 50–50 figures did not mean that the West and the Soviet Union actually possessed equal influence. Rather, they showed that the future of those two countries had not yet been decided. By contrast, the fate of Romania and Bulgaria already appeared settled. Greece was the main reason Churchill proposed the arrangement.

The British prime minister travelled to Moscow for a second time within several months. In late July and early August, he had already held talks there on similar issues, particularly the future of Poland.

From Britain’s perspective, the central problem was the rapid advance of the Red Army through Eastern Europe. Churchill’s strategy was to stop the Soviet Union’s expansion into Europe. His plan to open a second front in the Balkans and halt that advance failed at the Tehran Conference after Franklin Roosevelt refused to support it.

By then, governments in Romania and Bulgaria had already been replaced, and communists had come to power—exercising less influence in Romania and more in Bulgaria. Greece remained undecided. Greek communists were considerably stronger there and had a chance to take power. Baeva says that Greece was what concerned Churchill most throughout the Moscow discussions. This raises the question of why he was prepared to sacrifice British influence in Bulgaria and Romania in order to protect Britain’s position in Greece.

Source: dir.bg