43946 | 3 Feb. 2025 | 21:23

Thank you to the political forces for reaching an agreement on the main issue - holding early elections, with each of them making their own gesture - renunciation of a mandate to form a government within this parliament, writes Petar Stoyanov

There is one day in the post-totalitarian history of Bulgaria in which the country was literally on the edge of a civil war.

On February 4, 1997, the Bulgarian Socialist Party returned the investigation mandate and refused to form a cabinet under the leadership of Nikolay Dobrev, in an explosive atmosphere following the failure and downfall of the government of Jean Videnov.

How did this happen?

Under pressure or after a sober assessment of the situation, the socialist party gave up power and what were the consequences of this dramatic move? Since then, has this day inevitably come between the presidents Stoyanov and Parvanov, and a dispute has arisen that no one has yet resolved? How many files did Parvanov and Dobrev bring before Stoyanov when on this day in 1997 they gave up their management mandate? Were they willing to form a government at any cost, but were obstructed by Stoyanov, or did they themselves declare to him the possibility of not introducing the left-wing cabinet for a vote in parliament.

As a reporter, I was a direct witness to these events.

Then and later, I recorded the stories of the "heroes". Years ago, I had the opportunity to peek into unpublished transcripts from meetings of the left-wing parliamentary group, in the personal notes of Nikolay Dobrev and in his infamous green notebook, which preserved his efforts and disappointments in forming the impossible cabinet.

Based on this, I will try to give my interpretation of the events from 28 years ago.

At the end of 1996, Bulgaria fell into the worst economic and financial crisis in its recent history, accompanied by hyperinflation. In this unstable political period, governments were unable to cope with the situation, resulting in constant changes of power.

The opposition from the right together with the syndicates started daily protests amongst Sofia's streets.

In the Fall of 1996, Interior Minister Nikolai Dobrev prepares a confidential report on the State of the Banking System in Bulgaria. "Bad Loans - Unsecured and Serviced in 1995, Amount to 342.7 Billion Lev, Which is 40% of Gross Domestic Product," the document reads, listing the names of Banks, Bankers, and Schemes, as well as the colossal sums that have flowed through and damaged the budget.

The reason for the report is a sharp letter from the IMF, insisting that the dubious banks be closed. The authors of the report are experts from the National Security Service (NSS).

The report became popular as "Dobrev" and it is the first time that an analysis of the genesis of the new private commercial banks, their interaction with state financial institutions, the appointed bankers by the Bulgarian Communist Party and the schemes through which the banks were drained by party-affiliated and family-owned companies is made. (https://epicenter.bg/article/Sekretniyat-doklad-na-Nikolay-Dobrev-za-ruhvaneto-na-bankovata-sistema-u-nas/146526/11/0)

In this context, on December 21st 1996, the extraordinary congress of the Bulgarian Socialist Party started. After a dramatic discussion, Jean Videnov resigned as prime minister and leader of the party.

He was succeeded in the party by Georgi Parvanov, who was elected in the late hours of the night.

On the second day of the Congress, a deadly speech against Videnov and the policies led by him was given by Nikolay Dobrev. He turns the entire position of the party around, exposing the truth about the rule of Videnov. Dobrev outlines the picture of Bulgaria under the power of the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) and Videnov and says: "No one would applaud for such rule like ours. The people on the street are hungry, and we brought them to this point." (Editor note: The whole speech of Dobrev is published in my book "Ah, this power", released in January 2025, publ. "Zahariy Stoyanov.")

On January 8th, Nikolay Dobrev, interior minister in resignation, is nominated by the left-wing as future prime minister in the midst of a deep socio-political crisis in the country; immense dissatisfaction with the government that has spilled over into mass protests and street pressure, and an almost bankrupt state. He accepts the nomination after much "doubt" and hesitation within himself. Despite his assessment of the lack of consent and stability in the country, the hope prevails that he will succeed in forming a strong governing team "with coalition partners, with comrades from the BSP and experts" to prepare and implement a program to overcome the crisis.

On January 10, 1997, students from Sofia University gathered in front of the National Assembly. The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions "Podkrepa" declared a second national strike, later joined by the opposition. Dobrev was bombarded with snowballs in front of the parliament. In the evening, the building of the National Assembly was surrounded by a human chain. Violence erupted overnight. Stones were thrown at the parliament and the deputies were evacuated. There were casualties, including the deputy and former prime minister Filip Dimitrov, who ended up at Pirogov hospital with stitches and a bandage on his head, alongside other injured individuals. The goal is to prevent further protests. But the next day, people return to the streets with a concert and the slogan "We are the students, we are not afraid!" Protests against the creation of a second socialist cabinet continue.

On January 21, the mandate of Zhelyo Zhelev expires.

On January 28, ten days after taking office, newly elected President Petar Stoyanov hands a mandate to Dobrev to form a government, which his predecessor, Dr. Zhelyo Zhelev, has refused to do. In the following days, the candidate prime minister holds dozens of meetings, frantically forming a "broad expert government" after realizing that a single-party cabinet has no chance. Consultations are underway with the leaders of the European Left, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Bulgarian Business Bloc, the Civic Parliamentary Alliance, and even the Union leaders, along with experts. The negotiations are being held under complete secrecy. The names of the ministerial candidates are the most closely guarded secret in the country. At first, the BSP seems to accept the offer of coalition and even suggest their own candidate for minister - Vesselin Metodiev. However, this idea has a short lifespan. Refusals start to pour in from all sides. Experts turn down ministerial seats. Dobrev's efforts to achieve national unity against the looming hyperinflation hit a dead end. People on the street jeer at him, waving flags upside down in front of him.

On the evening of January 29th, negotiations between the leader of the Bulgarian Business Bloc, George Ganchev, and the newly-elected leader of the BSP, Georgi Purvanov, end in failure. George is categorical: "We will not support a cabinet of BSP. Even less if it includes old political muzzles like Pirinski."

On January 30, the embarrassment of the "Dobrev" cabinet becomes an increasingly evident reality. Petar Stoyanov announces that only returning the mandate can calm the anger on the streets. Kostov warns that the opposition will direct all their pressure towards Nikolay Dobrev, in order to prevent him from forming a second cabinet of the left.

But both in UDF and in BSP, they know that with a secret vote, 13-14 deputies of Kostov will cast their ballot "for" Dobrev.

However, there is no unanimity within the left. "Positano" has counted that there will be 7-8, and possibly 10-15 deputies from the centenarians who will vote "against" their second cabinet. And the scale will be balanced by BBB.  "Cash and procedure will play if Dobrev goes to the plenary hall with a cabinet in his pocket," I wrote in my analysis for "Trud" on January 30, 1997.

By the end of the day, Dobrev is already aware that the trust in his party, both within and outside the country, has been exhausted and he will not receive any financial support from anywhere. However, the hardliners in "Positano" do not think so. "We have no right to abdicate from power," says Nora Ananieva, member of the council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and deputy chairman of the National Assembly. Today, hardly anyone remembers Mincho Minchev from "Marxist Alternative," but at that time he was the leader of this strong ideological wing in the centennial that fiercely defended the line: "BSP has the moral and constitutional right to govern further. Even on spears!"

On the morning of February 2nd, a closed joint meeting of the parliamentary group and the National Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) will begin at 20 "Positano" Street.

Dobrev reports: all potential partners, syndicates and many experts have refused him. Internal and international isolation is a fact. He warns that if he does manage to form a government in parliament, he will have to turn the police against the streets. The other option is to resign under pressure from the streets in a matter of days, weeks or at most two to three months. A note in his notebook from 4 PM reads: "Total exhaustion of resources for cabinet, the names (for ministers - e.n.) are afraid." He persistently asks Kostov for another meeting, but this time he refuses, citing that he is being blocked by the National Committee of the Union of Democratic Forces.

At the end of the evening, a government was finally formed and it includes the following candidates for ministers. (Editor note: I read them from the notebook of Nikolay Dobrev)

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs - Georgi Pirinski;

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development - Chavdar Kanchev;

Deputy Prime Minister - Alexander Tomov;

Deputy Prime Minister - BANU;

Minister of Finance - Stoyan Alexandrov or Dimitar Kostov;

Minister of Foreign Economic Relations - Atanas Paparizov;

Minister of Interior - Sava Dzhendov;

Minister of Defense - Dimitar Pavlov or Lyuben Petrov (Anyo Angelov was on the line);

Minister of Justice - Georgi Bliznashki, Alexander Djerov or Kamen Sitnilski;

Minister of Energy - Rumen Ovcharov, Yanko Yanev;

Minister of Environment - Georgi Georgiev;

Minister of Agriculture - Krastyo Trendafilov;

Minister of Construction - architect Videlov;

Minister of Industry - Ivan Andonov or Ivan Ivanov,

Minister of Labor and Social Policy - Ivan Neykov or Yanaki Stoilov;

Minister of Culture - Bozhidar Dimitrov or Georgi Konstantinov, (Veselin Metodiev has been ruled out following the ban from UDF, Hristo Drumev and Stefan Danailov are also ruled out);

Minister of Health - Prof. Chernozyemski or Prof. Nikola Vasilev.

On February 3rd at 10 am, the plenum of BSP meets again at "Positano" 20. They must finalize Dobrev's cabinet. All socialists are pressuring for the formation and implementation of a government at any cost. Dobrev explains: "We are already in the minority, even if the government passes a secret vote in the National Assembly, it will not be able to govern due to lack of parliamentary and public resources". He calls on his party members to vote "with conscience" and declares to them: "Do not blame me for the absence of civil courage, integrity and socialist solidarity". And he hopes that the plenary session will discredit his cabinet. Unfortunately, this does not happen. The party's order is a government!

However, Dobrev has already made the decision to return his mandate. He says so in an interview for Reuters in the afternoon hours of February 3rd: "My opinion on resolving the crisis in Bulgaria is in full harmony with the EU's position. It has three points - politicians to agree on the date of the elections, I support and advocate for early elections. The second point is for the anti-corruption strategy to be banned." Second, to reach an agreement on a program, transitional or coalition government. And third, to resume talks with the IMF. I will return the mandate under these conditions. Because otherwise I will run away from responsibility. Because a single-party government is something very bad, but powerlessness is something terrible, catastrophic".

On February 4, at 11 am, the leadership of BSP gathers again at the social center. At 12 pm, Parvanov and Dobrev have to be at the president's. At around 11:15 am, in the hall of "Positano" 20, Dobrev reports the results of his efforts to form a cabinet: "We are going to the president with two folders. But let us be clear - there can be no more voting in this parliament. Even if tomorrow everyone votes for me, later on it won't happen. You have decided that from now on we are a government of the minority. I know that the votes of UDF will choose us. You probably know - another time, when there are 121 of our votes, several vote "against", and we make 135 votes. I consulted extensively with UDF - they will not enter the hall. The parliament is incomplete! Nobody has an interest to enter except those who want broad powers for an interim government. Yes, the party has an interest, I understand, but when is it better to protect its interest - now, as we fall apart, or when we fall apart a second time more strongly? I think that now the falling apart will be less and we will keep the party. I made this decision (to return the mandate) yesterday. I had to tell you this in order to be honest with you."

And he urged Parvanov to go to "Dondukov" 2.

If BSP decides to declassify the documents from these dramatic days, it will become clear that the return of the mandate was discussed on February 3 and 4 and that when the two went to the president, they knew what would happen at "Positano" 20. It is clear and categorical that Dobrev warned them that a new left-wing government has "no horizon". Furthermore, he directly stated to them: "You're not willing to put the gold at stake in order to support the government, are you?"

At 11:45, Parvanov and Dobrev stood before the president with two folders and a decision to return the mandate. They opened one - with a proposal for a cabinet to show that they have fulfilled their mandate to form a government. In the second one are the documents that Dobrev describes as "malicious". And he is closing it. They submit him the second one - with the letter from Dobrev, in which it literally says: "I find that under the created circumstances it is impossible to form the necessary government for the country, therefore I declare that I refuse to be elected as prime minister, as well as to present a new Council of Ministers for election in the National Assembly. I return the mandate given to me by you."

Stoyanov does not take either one. It is unclear why.

The meeting is only between the three of them.

There are no media. No one is filming. No outsider knows what has been said. That is why today we rely only on the words of the two living participants in one of the most dramatic political meetings in Bulgaria's recent history.

"Neither Dobrev, nor Parvanov returned the mandates voluntarily to save Bulgaria. They came to me with a folder. It contained the composition of the new cabinet of the Bulgarian Socialist Party with Prime Minister Nikolay Dobrev. If I had accepted this folder, it would have meant proposing to the National Assembly to vote for this government. I categorically refused to accept the offer for a new BSP government. And then I spent perhaps the most difficult hours of my life. That's when I decided to urgently convene the Consultative Council for National Security in order to exert pressure on the BSP not to propose a cabinet.

I recorded this account from Petar Stoyanov on February 3, 2007 - ten years after the incident.

Today, on February 3, 2025, he told it to me again:

"When the two of them arrived at 11:30, there were several thousand protesters outside the building. If they had come to refuse, I would have gone out in front of them and announced: 'You have won, the BSP has backed down'. And why then did I call for the Consultative Council at 4 p.m. after noon. It is quite simple - there was no resignation from the cabinet. On February 4, they came with a ready cabinet. They did not resign from forming a second government after Jean Videnov's resignation. If I had taken the folder, I would have had to bring it to the National Assembly for voting, where the BSP had an absolute majority. I refused to take the folder and three hours later I called a National Security Council meeting. It was only at this meeting that the BSP resigned from a second term and thus opened the way for new elections.

And another version:

"We did not return anything, we simply did not leave the folder with the names of the ministers, thus, in a formal constitutional understanding of the process, we did not fulfill the mandate. Our resignation is ours and it was justified at several consecutive meetings of the parliamentary group, the Executive Bureau, and all leadership bodies of the party.

We informed the president that we are ready to form a cabinet, but we are prepared to give up our mandate if the Consultative Council on National Security (CCNS) is convened. We requested for the council to accept a document in which the political forces represented in parliament would guarantee a dignified way out of the crisis and outline measures to prevent excesses, political complications, and the imposition of tension. It is absurd for him to claim that he rejected our mandate at 12 PM on February 4th. Because this immediately leads not to a political, but to a constitutional crisis - the state head rejects the candidate for prime minister proposed by his cabinet.

The story of Parvanov is a day after my conversation with Stoyanov - on February 4, 2007. He claims that Stoyanov's first reaction was to call Kostov, and their conversation lasted a long time: "We had to wait 30-40 minutes for Kostov's answer, after which Dobrev and I left, already having received confirmation of readiness to convene CCNS."

After returning the mandate, Parvanov and Dobrev leave the presidency through secret corridors under the Sheraton Hotel and head to "Positano" 20, knowing what kind of fire their supporters will subject them to.

An hour later, the plenum of the socialist party is convened again there.

Dobrev justifies his decision to withdraw from government before his fellow party members.

At 3pm, all leaders of the parliamentary represented parties, along with former Prime Minister Videnov and his ministers gather at the CCNS meeting with the President.

I am seeking the truth about this day, including in the memories of Jean Videnov, published in his book "Beyond the Political Theater", which came out in the summer of 1999.

"Parvanov and Dobrev showed the President the folder with the names of the Democratic Left candidate-ministers who had voted the day before, but they did not hand it over to him. Instead, they stated that considering the objections of the other political forces, they were not against discussing the possibility of not submitting the cabinet's project to parliament." (After Kiril Yordanov called for consultations at 12pm). Parvanov and Dobrev tell Stoyanov that they are returning their mandates, at 18:45 they declare this in front of the members of the National Consultative Council, in order for the documents for ending the political crisis to be formally accepted, which effectively means giving up their mandates - e.n.) I tried to steer them away from this logic, to tell them that the official position of the ruling coalition is completely different, but no one reacted and I left the council. "The first ones I informed that Kolyo and Georgi are giving up power were Velko Valkanov and Krasimir Premyanov," writes Jean Vidinov two years later.

The Council at the President's ends around 19:30 with the signing of a Declaration for National Reconciliation and a date for early elections. Petar Stoyanov appeared on the balcony of the presidency, carried by the nation's love and said: "The worst is yet to come. Heavy days await us. We must close the factory of illusions,”

The same day Petar Stoyanov made the following official statement:

“Today, the political forces represented in the Consultative Council on National Security have reached a historic decision. The situation in Bulgaria has never been so dramatic. We have never been closer to a serious political crisis. That is why I thank the political forces represented in parliament for reaching an agreement on the main issue. Early parliamentary elections to be held in the second week of April, with each one making their gesture – giving up their mandate to form a government within this parliament. I understand very well that with this resignation, an extremely large responsibility falls on me as a person who will have to appoint an interim cabinet that will have to govern Bulgaria for the next two to three months. I take this opportunity to declare that the illusion factory in Bulgaria must be shut down... We are facing many difficulties..."

In the red headquarters, they receive Dobrev and Parvanov with knives drawn. 'Cut off my head, I am not a traitor. If we stay in power, we cannot free the streets without violence. Do not underestimate the mass dissatisfaction! Secondly, we cannot stop the flight towards the abyss,' Dobrev defends his position in the evening hours of February 4 in front of the parliamentary group of the left.

He tells deputies that at the CCNS the Minister of Finance gave a report regarding the state's debt for the 2 months before the elections and Stoyanov was not pleased at all.

The deputy emphasized that the chief prosecutor has prohibited the transfer of new reserves (to the police) from other regions, "to protect the Parliament", even though there aren't enough people in Sofia. He asks his party members, "Can I survive once again and can we have another night like January 10-11? I am not scaring anyone, you were in the chamber! I have been asking you for three days, not if we will be in power, but how we will govern?" He receives no response.

However, the party's anger erupts, which will follow him to his death.

He returns home and does not leave for three days.

Appearing at an indoor meeting of the parliamentary left group on February 7th, he once again faces the comrade court. And he says: "You have the right to punish me, to shame me, and I will agree to that. There are voices for me to leave the party. If tomorrow's plenum makes a decision about me, my future will be clear - I will be a strong supporter of BSP."

Dobrev remained like this until the end of his life. Vidanov never forgave him for "betrayal". He did not even go to his funeral.

Parvanov dedicated his election as president in 2001 to Dobrev and wished for a street in Sofia to be named after him.

However, where are the two folders that Dobrev took to President Stoyanov?

To this day, no one has found them. "We showed them to him (to Stoyanov - editor note), but we did not hand them over. The mandate for forming a government was not given and the mandate was not consumed. With the declaration that was adopted at the CCNS, we made an informal resignation from power. This was our understanding of a dignified way out," explained Parvanov in 2007.

Until today, he and Stoyanov have different versions of what happened that day.

And the more time passes, the more fiercely each defends their position which, at least for now, is at the expense of the truth.

The dispute about the two folders also flared up in 2012 when I did parallel interviews with them again. Stoyanov even got upset that we were accusing him of being in a state of "complete incompetence" if we continue to claim that there were two folders, one of which was a refusal.

Parvanov is also angry: "There is a big lie that I am constantly fighting - that Stoyanov convinced us at 12 o'clock midnight to resign. Our decision was made one day before February 4th and was based on huge amounts of information. “  

Everyone has their own interpretation of the same event. One wants to establish February 4th as a lesson that power cannot be defended by any means, while the other sees it as a day to impose a resignation of power. That's why reconciliation seems impossible. As it has been for the past dramatic days of our history.

"Yes, peace between citizens has been preserved; I do not believe that we, together with Kolyo and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, can monopolize this achievement. However, for BSP, February 4th was not just another concession, but a clear civic position. The reasonable compromise showed that we are rejecting the fetishization of power," said Parvanov in 2022.

He also remembers the previous nightmare:

"We wore the mark of traitors for months on end, but no more - because in 1999, exhausted by our selfless and noble act as one clear... With this burden, with this asset, we completely won the local elections. We crushed them, while Ivan Kostov, Bakardzhiev, and Mikhailov were wandering and gossiping...

During those 20 days in 1997, Dobrév lost 13 kg, while I only lost 8. We slept on the sofa at "Positano" from outside in the corridor. 30 days - these were demonstrations, bricks were flying and windows were shattered, especially at the press center. The resistance was tough and the atmosphere for making this decision was dramatic...

Nikolay Dobrév was honest with himself. He remained so until the end of his life. He was honest with his party. But back then, they didn't understand him. Today, we should remember that one man's honesty saved Bulgaria from a civil war. And history should always be read and reread carefully. Because we often forget the lessons." It is time for the truth to take its rightful place in our history. Otherwise, our memory will gradually fade into political disputes and deprive us of an adequate understanding of events from which we must draw lessons.  

After the return of the mandate, the path was opened for resolving the political crisis in the country, in which President Petar Stoyanov played a crucial role.

Ten days later, on February 15, the interim government appointed by him, led by Stefan Sofiyanski, announced the introduction of a currency board. On February 17, they sent Bulgaria's application for membership in the North Atlantic Pact to Brussels, and on March 17, they restored cooperation with the IMF.

This was followed by early elections on April 19, 1997, which were won decisively with 52% and 137 parliamentary seats by the United Democratic Forces (UDF, The Democratic Party, BANU, and the BSDP)